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The "L-Word": A Short
History of Liberalism
by Terence Ball, University of Minnesota
and Richard Dagger, Arizona State University
Are these good or bad times for liberalism? On the domestic
front, after eight years of the Reagan administration and a presidential campaign in which liberalism became "the L-word," they
seem to be bad times indeed. The same can be said of Margaret
Thatcher's Britain. But elsewhere, especially in the Communist
world, events and regimes seem to be moving in a liberal direction. China after Tiananmen Square presents a notable exception, of course, but the Communist regimes of the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe are generally moving towards market economies and a greater concern for individual rights and liberties-two
of the hallmarks of liberal societies.
Hence the question: Are these good or bad times for liberalism? To answer, we shall need a broader perspective than a
survey of contemporary developments can provide. We shall
need to look back, that is, to see what liberalism was in order to
understand what it has become. Only then can we assess its current condition and prospects-and appreciate how politics in the
United States is largely an intramural debate between different
wings of liberalism.
continued on page 2
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History of Liberalism
continued from page 1

In the Beginning
Liberalism did not begin as a self-conscious social and political
movement. This is evident in the fact that "liberal" did not enter
the vocabulary of politics until the early 1800s, at least a century
after what we now call liberalism became an important force in
political thought and action. Like "liberty," "liberal" derives from
the Latin liber, free, and before the 19th century it was commonly
used to mean generous or tolerant-an attitude befitting a gentleman, much as a "liberal education" was meant to prepare a
young gentleman for life. Through an extension of this common
use, "liberal" became a label applied to those who sought a more
tolerant and open society-a society whose members would be
free to pursue their own ideas and interests with as little interference as possible. This first happened in Spain when a faction of
the Spanish Cortes of 1810-181 I adopted the name Libera/es. 1
From there the term spread quickly to France and Great Britain,
where the party known as the Whigs evolved by the 1840s into
the Liberal Party.
These self-proclaimed liberals were understandably eager to
claim descent from prominent political and intellectual figuresLocke, Montesquieu, and Voltaire, for example-and movements
such as the Protestant Reformation and the Glorious Revolution
of 1688. They did this partly in order to gain credibility and support, a tactic common to political actors of all persuasions, and
partly to understand the bases of their own beliefs. This meant
that anyone who had spoken for individual liberty and against the
various constraints on that liberty had some claim to being a
liberal, even if he or she could not have used the word in selfdescription. This meant, in particular, that the original liberals
were the people who reacted against two of the characteristic
features of medieval society in Europe: religious conformity and
ascribed status.
Religious conformity was the norm in medieval Europe, where
church and state were supposed to be partners in the defense of
Christendom. Indeed, there was no clear distinction between
church and state at that time, and almost no sense that such a distinction was worth drawing. For its part, the Christian Church
saw its mission as saving souls for the kingdom of God-something that could best be done by teaching and upholding orthodoxy, or "correct belief." Those who took an unorthodox view
of Christianity or rejected it altogether thus threatened the
Church's attempts to do what it saw as the work and will of God.
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To enforce conformity to its doctrines, the Church used not only
its own powers, but called on the secular authorities of Christendom to use theirs. Whether out of religious conviction or a desire
to r:naintain order in their domains, the secular rules were usually
willing to suppress those the Church deemed heretics or infidels.
The other feature of medieval society against which early liberals reacted was ascribed status-the condition in which a person's social standing is based not on one's achievement, but the
status of one's parents. One was born a noble, a free commoner,
or a serf; and tha't, with few exceptions, was all there was to it.
Although ostensibly equal in the eyes of God, men and women of
different ranks were not equals on God's earth or in man's state.
The intricate arrangements of feudalism, with its lords, vassals,
villeins, and serfs, reflected these differences, as did the parliaments or estates-general that began to appear in the late Middle
Ages.
Against this society rooted in ascribed status and religious conformity, liberalism emerged as the first distinctive political ideology. But the liberal reaction did not take form until a series of
social, economic, and cultural changes shook the medieval order.
Many of these were directly related to the outburst of creativity
in the 14th and 15th centuries known as the Renaissance. But
there was also the Black Death, which took the lives of about
one-third of Europe's population between 1347 and 1351,
thereby loosening the medieval social structure and opening new
opportunities for the survivors. The expansion of commerce in
the late Middle Ages also played a part, as did the wave of
exploration set in motion by this commerce. But of all the developments that contributed to the decline of the medieval order
and the rise of liberalism, the most important was probably the
Protestant Reformation.
When Martin Luther struck the spark that became the Reformation, he meant neither to encourage people to believe and
worship in whatever way they chose nor to separate church from
state. Apparently he expected that everyone who read the Bible
-something he and his colleagues made easier by translating it for
the first time into German-could only understand it as he did.
But contrary to Luther's expectations, his proclamation of the
"priesthood of all believers," with its stress on individual conscience, opened the floodgates to a variety of interpretations of
the Bible and a profusion of Protestant sects. Separation of
church from state followed, as the reformers' challenge to the
universal authority of the Roman Church gave secular authorities
an opportunity to expand their power at the Church's expense.
Thus Henry VIII of England, with the approval of Parliament, created a national church with himself at its head.
The Reformation also provoked a series of bloody wars in
which contention over religious doctrine led to questions about
the nature of political authority and obedience. Should a conscientious Christian obey a ruler who tried to enforce conformity to
doctrines, whether Protestant or Catholic, that the conscientious
person took to be wrong? Both Luther and Calvin said, with some
qualifications, that one must disobey but not resist such a ruler,
for all rulers derive their power from God. Later, however, some
of Calvin's followers concluded not only that resistance is sometimes justified, but that the people have a right to overthrow
rulers who deny them freedom of religion. By this they meant
everyone's freedom to practice Calvinism, to be sure. Yet their
arguments for freedom of conscience, resting in part on the claim
that government receives its authority indirectly from God
through the consent of the people, planted the seeds of the argument in favor of religious toleration. 2
Without intending to do so, then, the Protestant reformers
prepared the way for liberalism. By teaching that salvation comes
through faith alone, Luther and the other reformers encouraged
people to value the individual conscience more than the preservation of unity and orthodoxy. From individual conscience to indicontinued on page 3
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continued from page 2
vidual liberty was still a radical step for the time, but .it was a step
that liberals took in the 17th and 18th centuries. For 1n those centuries liberalism emerged as an attempt to free individual.s from
the constraints of religious conformity and ascribed status 1n society-an attempt, that is, to work a fundamental transformation
of society.

Liberalism and Revolution
It is no accident that the 17th and I 8th centuries are associated
with revolutions as well as with the emergence of liberalism. In
fact, "revolution" entered the vocabulary of politics in 17th century England, when it was borrowed from astronomy to re.fer to
a return, or revolving back, to an earlier pos1t1on or cond1t1on. 3
By the time of the French Revolution, however, "revolution"
suggested something new and bold-a thorough transformation
of an entire social order. Liberal ideas helped to 1nsp1re this revolution, just as they did the more modest revolutions in England
and its North American colonies.
The revolution in England occurred in two acts, as it were,
beginning with the civil war of the 1640s. Pen and ink played as
great a part in this war as bullets and sword. From every point of
view came a vast outpouring of pamphlets, treatises, sermons,
and even major works of political theory. Among the latt~r was
the first book of philosophical significance to bear the d1st1nct1ve
stamp of liberalism, Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan ( 1651 ).
Hobbes's conclusions, of course, were anything but liberal. For
the sake of security, he argued, the people of a commonwealth
grant the sovereign absolute power, retaining only the right to defend themselves when the sovereign threatens them with "death,
wounds, or imprisonment." What gives Hobbes's theory the
stamp of liberalism is not his conclusion, however, but his premises. Individuals are equals, on Hobbes's account, and everyone
has a natural right to be free; but in order to protect their interests, individuals consent to create and obey government. In these
respects, Hobbes's position is very much that of a liberal. But it
remained for John Locke to use these premises to reach a conclusion that we may definitely regard as liberal.
The reaction against both religious conformity and ascribed
status is clear in Locke's work of the 1680s, the period of the
second act of the English revolution. In his Letter Concerning
Toleration ( 1689) Locke maintained that it is wron.g for governments to force their subjects to conform to a particular religion.
Drawing a distinction between private and public matters, Locke
said that religion is normally a private concern and not, therefore,
a proper subject for government interference. Governments cannot save souls, for this can come only through 1nd1v1dual belief.
Unless the practice of a religion directly threatens the public
order, then, government must allow the adherents of any rel.i~ion
to worship as they see fit. For Locke, this meant that Catholicism
and atheism should not be tolerated. Catholics owe their first
loyalty to a foreign monarch, the pope, so they cannot be trustworthy members of a commonwealth; nor can atheists, for a~y
one who denies the existence of God, salvation, and damnation
cannot be trusted at all. But Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and the
Puritan sects-the groups who figured so prominently in the
religious and political upheaval of 17th century England-must
learn not only to stop trying to enforce conformity.to their views
on their fellow citizens, but also to tolerate any religion that confined its practice to the private sphere.
Complementing his work on toleration was Locke's Two Treatises of Government ( 1690). Published in the afterma.th of the Glorious Revolution but written, for the most part, during the early or
mid-I 680s, the Two Treatises inquired into the foundations of
political authority. In the Second Treatise, Locke proceede.d from
premises very similar to Hobbes's, yet reached a very different
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conclusion. Both denied that social status is somehow fixed or
ascribed by nature, and both believed that government is
founded on the consent of the people; but Locke believed that
people can only consent. to create and obey a limited or constitutional government. To give anyone absolute power over our lives
would be both irrational and contrary to the will of God. Both
Hobbes and Locke also believed that people have natural rights;
but for Locke this included not merely a right to self-defense, but
rights to life, liberty, and property. These, in turn, provided the
basis for a right of revolution-a right that would be invoked four
score and six years after the publication of the Two Treatises in the
Declaration of Independence of the United States.
Long considered a prime example of Lockean liberalism, the
character and provenance of the Declaration of Independence is
now a matter of scholarly dispute. 4 But there is no doubt that the
argument of the Declaration, as well as some of its striking
phrases, closely resembles Locke's. This, perhaps more than the
"truths" Jefferson declaims, is self-evident:
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.-That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their JUSt powers
from the consent of the governed.-That whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, ...
Not only the Declaration, but Thomas Paine's Common Sense
( 1776) provide compressed versions of Locke's argument-an
argument that Jefferson later said merely represented ''the common sense of the matter .... " 5 Two features of this "common
sense'' view deserve particular attention. The first is the claim
that "all men are created equal, ... " This caused some embarrassment when the Declaration was issued, for a number of
colonists, "patriots" as well as "tories," pointed out the hypocrisy of proclaiming the equality of all mankind while cont1nu1ng the
practice of slavery. 6 The source of this embarrassment was 1n fact
a general problem in the position of the early liberals. For they
spoke a democratic language when they said that all men are
naturally free and equal and that government rests on the consent of the people; yet they never explained whom they counted
as "men" or "the people." By making these claims, however, the
early liberals at least provided an opening for those who could
say-as Mary Wollstonecraft and others soon did-if all men are
created equal, why isn't this or that group of men or women
being treated as equals?
The second feature of Jefferson's "common sense" view that
deserves special attention is his defense of the ri~hts a~d liberties
of individuals against governments. This again .1s typical of. th~
early liberals, who saw government as a cont1nu1ng threat to 1~d1vidual liberty. But it also betrays the influence of the classical
republican theorists, such as Machiavelli and James Harrington,
who warned against the danger of corruption. Republicanism and
liberalism are difficult to sort out at this point (and others), but
there were differences of emphasis. The republicans worried
about the corruption of the people as much as the corruption of
the government, whil~ the early liberals were concerned almost
exclusively with the abuse of power by the government. Moreover, the republicans looked upon freedom as mostly a matter of
governing oneself through political participation, and therefore
closely connected with civic virtue; but on the liberal view freedom was more a matter of being free from interference by the
government, and virtue something to be learned and practiced in
private life.
This heady mixture of republican and liberal thought not only
served to justify the independence of the United States, but to
provide the philosophical basis for its constitution as well. At th.e
same time the constitution was taking effect, furthermore, this
mixture was inspiring a truly revolutionary upheaval in France .. To
understand the part that liberalism played 1n this revolution, 1t 1s
continued on page 4
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necessary to remember three important characteristics of the
ancien regime that the revolution attacked: religious conformity,
aristocratic privilege, and absolute rule. Locke had argued against
all three in his writings, and the French philosophes followed him in
attacking at least the first two. When the Revolution came, however, all three were condemned as contrary to reason and rights.
In the National Assembly's Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
the Citizen ( 1789), the first article dismisses aristocratic privilege
and ascribed status with the assertion, "Men are born, and
always continue, free and equal in respect of their rights. Civil distinctions, therefore, can be founded only on public utility." The
second article proclaims ''the natural and imprescriptible rights of
man" to "liberty, property, security, and resistance of oppression," and the third says that the "nation" is the "source of all
sovereignty," which entails that no one can "be entitled to any
authority that is not expressly derived from it." So much for
absolute rule. Nor did the Declaration spare religious conformity,
declaring in the tenth article that "No man ought to be molested
on account of his opinions, not even on account of his religious
opinions, provided his avowal of them does not disturb the public
order established by the law" (emphasis in original).
In all these respects, the French Revolution began as an attempt
to transform France into a liberal society. To many historians, and
not only Marxists, this has meant that the Revolution was principally an uprising of the bourgeoisie, for it was the bourgeoisie in
particular that resented the opportunities denied them by aristocratic privilege. They wanted a society open to talent and
achievement, where a man might prove his worth through competition, including economic competition.
Economic opportunity was especially important to the merchants, bankers, lawyers, and professional people who composed
the bourgeoisie or middle class, in France and elsewhere, for
acquiring wealth was practically the only way they could improve
their social position. But in the Middle Ages and the early modern
period in Europe there were numerous restrictions on manufacturing and commerce, such as the traditional Christian ban on
usury and a host of national and local regulations concerning
working conditions and the production, distribution, and sale
of goods. In the 17th and 18th centuries, there were new restrictions associated with the prevailing economic theory, .
mercantilism.
In their efforts to remove obstacles to individual liberty, many
liberals began to argue that economic exchanges are essentially a
private matter between persons who are pursuing profits. This
emphasis on private profit ran against the grain of much of the
Christian and republican traditions, neither of which assigned
much value to either privacy or profits. But the 1700s produced
some forceful statements of the argument that people ought to
be free to pursue their private interests-Bernard Mandeville's
Fable of the Bees ( 1714), for instance, and the French physiocrats,
who summarized their views in the phrase, Laissez faire, laissez
passer.'' Capitalism found its most thorough and influential
defense, however, in Adam Smith's Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations ( 1776). Smith argued for an economic policy that would allow individuals to compete freely in the
marketplace. He saw this as the fairest policy, since it gives everyone an equal opportunity, as well as the most efficient and most
conducive to the public interest. For there is nothing like selfinterest to lead people to provide the goods and services that
others want. As Smith put it, "It is not from the benevolence of
the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner,
but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk
to them of our own necessities but of their advantage" (Book I,
Chapter II).
Throughout the 18th century, then, liberalism proved a revolutionary doctrine, one that was reshaping the religious, political,
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social and economic relations of people in Europe and North
America. It continued to play this part in the 19th century, inspiring revolutions in South America as well as Europe, and consolidating its strength in England and the United States. And in
England in particular, the theoretical development of liberalism
took new directions.

Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century
Perhaps the best way to characterize these new directions is to
say that 1'.he liberal attitude toward democracy and government
changed during the 19th century. Where earlier liberals had
spoken the language of equality, that is, liberal thinkers of 19th
century England took the further step of calling for expansions of
the franchise; and where earlier liberals regarded government as,
in Paine's words, a "necessary evil," some in the 19th century
came to see it as a necessary ally in the struggle to promote individual liberty. In both cases, Utilitarianism in general and John
Stuart Mill in particular played vital parts.
Jeremy Bentham, the original leader of the Philosophic Radicals,
or Utilitarians, died in 1832, the year of the Reform Bill that
extended the vote to England's middle-class males. Bentham had
worked for the passage of this bill, but he preferred a more
democratic franchise-a vote for all men, and perhaps (he was
not firm on this point) for all women, too. He came to this view
slowly, led by his commitment to the principle of utility. As Bentham saw it, "Nature has placed mankind under the governance
of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone
to determine what we ought to do, as well as what we shall do.' ' 7
Anything, then, that helps us to avoid pain or achieve pleasure
has utility and helps to make us happy. But the things that give
utility are scarce, and some people's pleasures come at the
expense of pain to others, which means that we must have a principle to tell us how to act when a conflict of interest arises. That
principle, Bentham said, is the principle of utility-do whatever
will promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number-and
it is the "business of governmer·t to promote the happiness of
society, by punishing and rewarding. " 8
Bentham drew two general conclusions from this. The first was
that in most cases government could best promote the greatest
happiness of the greatest number by leaving people alone. The
individual is usually the best judge of his or her own interests, he
said, so government should usually let people pursue their interests as they see fit. The second conclusion was that government is
not likely to effect the happiness of society if it is open to only a
portion of the people. In the pursuit of utility, Bentham declared,
everyone is to count equally. The government must take everyone's utility into account, and it can do this only if everyone, or
almost everyone, is allowed to vote.
Bentham and his associate, James Mill, occasionally qualified
their enthusiasm for a democratic franchise-Mill once suggested
that denying the vote to women, men under 40, and the poorest
one-third of the population would still allow for full representation of social interests-but they were nevertheless in the vanguard in their day. Mill's son, John Stuart Mill, pressed the point in
the mid- I 800s. A staunch supporter of women's rights, including
the right to vote, Mill called for adult suffrage. Yet in his case, too,
there were qualifications, the most significant being the scheme of
plural voting he advanced in Considerations on Representative Government ( 1861 ). There Mill recommended representative democracy as the best possible form of government by appealing to the
elevating qualities of political participation. Political participation
exercises the mental and moral faculties, he claimed, and thus
promotes intelligence, discipline, and devotion to the public interest. If society is to derive the most benefit from this exercise, it
must extend the right to political participation to almost all adult
citizens. Yet it would be foolish to entrust everyone, the ignorant
continued on page 5
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and unenlightened as well as the informed and public-spirited,
with an equal voice in public deliberations. Almost every man and
woman should have a vote, therefore, but those with higher
levels of education and intellectually more demanding occupations
should have two, three, or more.
Mill's ambivalence toward democracy probably derives from
his fear of the ''tyranny of the majority,'' a fear he expressed to
lasting effect in On Liberty ( 1859). In that much-debated essay Mill
expressed his alarm at what he took to be a new threat to liberty.
Now that government is responsible to the people, he said, or at
least to those who vote, the majority of voters can use legal coercion to deny liberty to those who do not share their views. More
directly, the "moral coercion of public opinion" can and does
stifie freedom of thought and action by making social outcasts of
individuals who do not conform to social customs and beliefs.
Against this new tyranny, Mill proposed "one very simple principle": "the only purpose for which power can be exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." He defended this principle-the so-called
"harm principle"-by appealing not to natural rights, but to utility. Freedom is a good thing, he argued, because both individuals
and society as a whole will benefit if people are encouraged to
think and act freely. For the individual, freedom is as vital to personal development as food is to physical survival. It is always
possible, of course, that people who speak and act freely will
make others uncomfortable or unhappy. But in the long run this
works to the benefit of society, too. For progress is possible only
where there is an open competition among different opinions and
beliefs-a marketplace of ideas.
Mill's defense of liberty took a form familiar to earlier liberals. It
rests on a distinction between private (or self-regarding) and
public (or other-regarding) matters, for instance, and suggests
that individual liberty must be protected from interference by
government and society. There was another dimension to Mill's
view of liberty, however, and it marked a shift in the attitude of
many liberals toward government. Although Mill defined freedom
in On Liberty as the absence of restraint, his emphasis on the
growth and development of the individual person has more in
common with Aristotle than with Bentham. For freedom, as Mill
conceived it, is largely a matter of being free to realize one's
potential. In some of Mill's later work, and especially in the writings of T. H. Green and the English Idealists, this conception of
freedom suggested that government could and should be something more than a nightwatchman protecting the life, liberty, and
property of the citizen.
Green couched this argument in terms of a distinction between

negative and positive liberty. There is a sense, he said, in which
freedom is merely the absence of restraint. But it has a positive
dimension, too, a sense in which freedom is the positive power or
ability to do something. Thus we may say that a child born into
poverty, with no real opportunity to escape, is not truly free to
grow and develop to the full extent of his or her abilities. But if
we admit this, anyone who values individual liberty will want to
take steps to overcome those circumstances-poverty, ignorance, illness, and prejudice among them-that pose such formidable obstacles to positive freedom. And this means that
society, acting through government, should take steps to promote the welfare of its people-and do so in the name of individual liberty.
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries a number of scholars
and political figures adopted and extended these views, leading to
a sharp split between these "welfare" or "reform" liberals, on
the one hand, and their "neoclassical liberal" rivals, on the other.
In the late 1800s neoclassical liberalism found its most prominent
expression in the Social Darwinism of such writers as Herbert
Spencer and William Graham Sumner. As the franchise expanded

to include the working class, however, and the welfare state
began to emerge, neoclassical liberalism began to fade. In the
industrial world, moreover, the days of the entrepreneur seemed
to have given way to the days of the corporation, the trust, the
syndicate and conglomerate. Business was now "big business,"
and many people began to call for government intervention in the
marketplace not to restrict competition, but to keep the large
corporations from choking it off. Under the impetus of these
developments, welfare liberalism came gradually to be known
simply as liberalism.

Liberalism Today
This is not to say that neoclassical liberalism ever entirely disappeared, for some economists (e.g., Friedrich Hayek and Milton
Friedman) and at least one novelist (Ayn Rand) continued to press
the case against active government and the welfare state in their
writings. In the 1970s and '80s, furthermore, neoclassical liberalism has enjoyed a revival. The emergence of the Libertarian Party
is one sign of this revival, as is the admiration for "free market"
policies so evident in the Thatcher and Reagan governments. Yet
another is the philosophical respectability won for neoclasical
views by Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia ( 1974).
Still, welfare liberalism remains the stronger branch as we enter
the last decade of the 20th century. The Libertarian Party has had
little success at the polls, and neither Thatcher nor Reagan has dismantled the welfare state. As for philosophical respectability,
John Rawls's A Theory of justice ( 1971) has given welfare liberalism
a powerful theoretical statement at least as influential as Nozick's.
It is possible, of course, that welfare liberalism is the stronger
branch of a weak or dying tree. George Bush's presidential campaign, with his repeated references to Michael Dukakis as a "bigspending liberal" and an "ultra-liberal," suggests that this is the
case. For all his attempts to turn "liberal" into "the L-word,"
however, Bush, like most Republicans, is a liberal, albeit one who
seems unable to decide whether he prefers the welfare or neoclassical camp. If he appears to be a conservative, it is largely
because the established way of life that our conservatives want to
preserve is itself rooted in liberalism. And if he appears to be a
pragmatic politician who is above or beyond ideology, it is
because liberalism is so deeply rooted in American thought as to
seem, as Jefferson said, "the common sense of the subject .... "
So it is that political debate in the United States is largely an
intramural contest between different wings of liberalism, with the
welfare liberals dominant. Yet there seems little chance that they
will overwhelm or absorb their neoclassical rivals. On the contrary, there is some reason to believe that the differences between the two factions may grow sharper. To this point the two
have agreed on ends-a society in which individuals have an equal
opportunity to choose and pursue their goals freely-but disagreed on the best means to achieve them-an active government or a nightwatchman state. But if welfare liberalism continues
to move in a more egalitarian direction, as Rawls and others suggest it should, this disagreement over means may look more and
more like a disagreement over ends. Add to this the changes
underway in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and we may
have the beginning of a shift in ideological alignments, with welfare
liberalism and various forms of socialism merging into something
that might be called social democracy, on the one hand, and
opposing an alliance of neoclassical liberals and conservatives, on
the other.
Whether this does or does not happen, two general conclusions can be drawn about the current state of liberalism. The first
is that liberalism is not the revolutionary force it once was. Or not
in the West, at any rate. For the liberal attack on ascribed status,
religious conformity, or political absolutism still strikes at the foundations of society in some parts of the world. This is most evident
in Iran and other countries of the Middle East, where liberalism
continued on pa2e 6
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may have provoked a reactionary response from Islamic fundamentalists. In Eastern Europe and Asia, moreover, various protests against Communist forms of ascribed status and political
absolutism claim "liberalization" as their goal. In the Western
world, however, the aims of the early liberals are now deeply
entrenched in public policy and public opinion. In these places liberalism is no longer a revolutionary ideology, but an ideology
defending a revolution already won.
A second conclusion is that liberals are now wrestling with two
extremely difficult problems-problems that are difficult partly
because they stem from liberals' basic commitments to individual
liberty and equality of opportunity. The first is, how far should individuals be able to go in exercising their freedom? Most liberals,
welfare and neoclassical alike, accept something like Mill's harm
principle. When it comes time to apply the principle, however,
the difficulty of deciding what harms someone becomes clear.
Many liberals say that such "victimless crimes" as prostitution,
gambling, and the sale of pornography should not be crimes at all.
Others respond that these crimes are not as "victimless" as they
appear. So the argument continues without resolution. Despite
their desire to separate the area of private freedom from the
area of public control, then, liberals have found the boundary between private and public impossible to draw with any precision.
The second problem grows out of the liberal commitment to
equal opportunity. For the neoclassical liberal, this means simply
that everyone ought to be free to make his or her way in the
world without unfair discrimination. The liberal should then see to
it that discrimination on the basis of race, religion, gender-of
anything other than talent and ability-is illegal. Most welfare liberals want to take the matter further, however. They claim that
government ought to take steps to help disadvantaged people
enjoy an equal opportunity in life. But how far should this go?
Should we try to bring about a more nearly equal distribution of
wealth and resources, as Rawls suggests, in order to promote
true equality of opportunity? Is this fair to those who have earned
their wealth, as Nozick maintains, without violating the rights of
others? Should we endorse affirmative action programs in order.·
to compensate women and members of racial minority groups
for the discrimination they have suffered in the past? But aren't
these way~ of discriminating against some people by discriminating in favor of others? Can this be justified in the name of equality
of opportunity?
These questions are especially troublesome for liberals because
they are the kinds of questions liberalism leads people to raise. So
whether one thinks these good or bad times for liberalism is likely
to depend on how he or she reacts to the current inability of
liberals to provide satisfactory answers to these questions. Some
may see this as a serious or even fatal weakness-a sign that liberalism is lost or exhausted, at the end of its rope. A more sympathetic response might be to say that liberalism is still doing what
it has always done-searching for ways to advance the cause of
individual liberty and opportunity. Certainly anyone who shares
Mill's belief that flexing our mental and moral muscles is vital to
individual growth will find plenty of room for exercise-and conclude that these may be good times indeed for liberalism.

Note
*Thanks to Jack Crittenden for comments on an earlier draft. Portions
of this article are drawn from Terence Ball and Richard Dagger, Political
Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal (New York: Harper & Row, forthcoming).
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